UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

2-3-2021

State v. Watring Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48019

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported

Recommended Citation
"State v. Watring Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48019" (2021). Not Reported. 6895.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/6895

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Electronically Filed
2/3/2021 12:52 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
NO. 48019-2020
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-19-3376
v.
)
)
SHERRI LEANN WATRING,
)
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)
________________________
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA
________________________
HONORABLE JASON D. SCOTT
District Judge
________________________
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #8712
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ........................................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ..................................................................................................... 1
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ............................................................................................ 9
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................ 10
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Entering An Order Of
Restitution Without Properly Considering Ms. Watring’s Ability To
Repay The Amount In The Future ....................................................................................... 10
A. Introduction

............................................................................................................... 10

B. Standard Of Review....................................................................................................... 10
C. The District Court Did Not Act Consistently With The Applicable
Legal Standards, Because There Is No Substantial Evidence That
Ms. Watring Has Any Foreseeable Ability To Repay The
Amount Of Restitution Awarded ................................................................................... 11
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 16
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .................................................................................................. 17

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
State v. Bodenbach, 165 Idaho 577 (2019)................................................................................. 10
State v. Bybee, 115 Idaho 541 (Ct. App. 1989) .................................................................... 13, 16
State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661 (2020) ................................................................................passim
State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882 (2013)........................................................................................ 11
State v. Wisdom, 161 Idaho 916 (2017) ................................................................... 11, 12, 13, 15

Statutes
I.C. § 19-5304 ................................................................................................................. 6, 11, 14

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Sherri Leann Watring asserts the district court abused its discretion by entering an order
of restitution without properly considering her ability to repay the amount in the future. The
district court ordered Ms. Watring to pay $38,911.00 in restitution, after her conviction for two
counts of felony abuse, exploitation, or neglect of a vulnerable adult, and one count of
misdemeanor petit theft. However, the district court did not act consistently with the applicable
legal standards, because there is no substantial evidence that Ms. Watring has any foreseeable
ability to repay the amount of restitution awarded.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ms. Watring worked as a caregiver for the elderly William and Joella Howell for almost
eight years. (See Trial Tr., p.492, Ls.19-21.)1 After she met them in 2011, she initially worked
for them three days a week, doing their shopping, making doctors’ appointments, and performing
housekeeping. (See Trial Tr., p.492, L.23 – p.493, L.16.) In 2013, she went from three days a
week to five days a week. (See Trial Tr., p.493, Ls.17-23.) In 2016, Mr. Howell suffered an
atrial fibrillation of the heart that caused him to pass out, and Ms. Watring began doing more
health care duties. (See Trial Tr., p.494, Ls.4-17.) Ms. Watring started 24-hour care for the
Howells in 2017. (See Trial Tr., p.494, Ls.21-23.)
Mr. Howell died on February 1, 2018, when he was almost

years old. (See Trial

Tr., p.186, L.11 – p.188, L.6, p.493, Ls.7-9.) The Howells’ son and daughter-in-law found a
hospice care provider for Ms. Howell, and they obtained a court order to give them temporary

1

All citations to “Trial Tr.” refer to the transcript of the jury trial conducted on December 16, 17,
and 18, 2019.
1

guardianship and have Ms. Watring leave the premises. (See Trial Tr., p.210, L.5 – p.211, L.4,
p.281, L.3 – p.282, L.7.) Police officers and hospice care workers went with the Howells’ son
and daughter-in-law to the Howells’ house to give Ms. Watring the court order on February 22,
2018. (See Trial Tr., p.211, Ls.2-4, p.282, Ls.3-14.)
The following day, a Boise Police Department officer responded to an exploitation of a
vulnerable adult call at the Howells’ residence. (See Trial Tr., p.189, L.12 – p.190, L.7.) After
speaking with the Howells’ son and daughter-in-law, the officer tried to find Ms. Watring
because he was looking for Mr. Howell’s ashes, which had been removed from the house. (See
Trial Tr., p.190, L.6 – p.191, L.9.) The officer was unable to find Ms. Watring or recover any
ashes. (See Trial Tr., p.192, Ls.1-3, p.195, Ls.7-9.) Later, officers recovered the urn the ashes
had been in, but not the ashes. (See Trial Tr., p.208, L.10 – p.209, L.12.)
The State charged Ms. Watring by Information with two counts of felony abuse,
exploitation, or neglect of a vulnerable adult, and one count of misdemeanor petit theft.
(R., pp.33-34.) Ms. Watring entered a not guilty plea to the charges, and exercised her right to a
jury trial. (See R., pp.37, 324-342.)
During Ms. Watring’s jury trial, on the first count of abuse, exploitation, or neglect of a
vulnerable adult, the State presented witness testimony that Ms. Howell appeared to be
dehydrated while under Ms. Watring’s care, and that Ms. Watring only fed Ms. Howell oatmeal,
applesauce, and juice. (See Trial Tr., p.333, Ls.4-6, p.339, L.1 – p.340, L.4.) Witnesses for the
State testified that Ms. Howell gained weight and improved in appearance after Ms. Watring was
removed as caregiver. (See Trial Tr., p.293, L.15 – p.294, L.14, p.348, Ls.16-22.) Ms. Howell
died on June 25, 2018. (See Trial Tr., p.219, Ls.22-25.) According to the State’s witnesses,
Ms. Howell also had pressure sores and incontinence dermatitis, and Ms. Watring refused
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instructions to stop using a medical cream on the sores, did not turn Ms. Howell, and left her in
soiled clothes and bedding. (See Trial Tr., p.249, Ls.10-13, p.335, Ls.10-14, p.342, Ls.1-17.)
On the second count of abuse, exploitation, or neglect of a vulnerable adult, the State
presented witness testimony and other evidence that Ms. Watring had power of attorney over the
Howells, and that she had access to the Howells’ financial accounts and credit cards. (See Trial
Tr., p.396, L.20 – p.411, L.16.) The State presented evidence of money transfers from accounts
where the Howells were signatories to accounts where only Ms. Watring was a signatory. (See,
e.g., Trial Tr., p.415, L.10 – p.418, L.17, p.434, L.21 – p.436, L.12; State’s Exs. 14-16.) Further,
in the time period between December 2016 and February 2018, the Howells’ credit cards accrued
about $25,000 in debt. (See Tr., p.439, L.10 – p.440, L.17, p.450, Ls.4-7.) The State also
presented evidence that Ms. Watring’s estimated annual total compensation was about $34,000,
and other checks or money transfers to Ms. Watring were not part of that compensation. (See
Tr., p.444, L.11 – p.446, L.21.)
Ms. Watring testified that she was reluctant to have the power of attorney put in her
name. (See Trial Tr., p.495, L.20 – p.496, L.1.) She testified that she made arrangements with
the Howells to only get paid for a third of the hours that she worked, after Mr. Howell became
stressed about his ability to pay the bills.

(See Trial Tr., p.496, L.10 – p.497, L.1.) Per

Ms. Watring, her name was on some of the accounts the Howells held because she had power of
attorney. (See Trial Tr., p.497, Ls.12-22.) She testified that she would do the shopping and the
Howells would reimburse her for it. (See Trial Tr., p.497, L.23 – p.498, L.1.) Ms. Watring also
testified that a transfer made to her savings account on February 2, 2018, was to reimburse her
for paying for a walk-in Jacuzzi for the Howells. (See Trial Tr., p.499, L.24 – p.500, L.16.)
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On the petit theft count, the State presented evidence that Ms. Watring did not notify
Mr. Howell’s children that he had died until about a week after the fact. (See Trial Tr., p.206,
L.25 – p.207, L.2, p.322, Ls.6-17.) The Howells’ son testified that he unsuccessfully tried to
recover Mr. Howells’ ashes from Ms. Watring. (See Trial Tr., p.208, L.17 – p.209, L.13.) In a
police interview, Ms. Watring stated that she took the ashes to Moses Lake, Washington, and
disposed of them there. (See Trial Tr., p.383, Ls.13-15.) She told the police she made a promise
to the Howells regarding the ashes. (See Trial Tr., p.383, Ls.8-12.) Ms. Watring testified that
Mr. and Ms. Howell gave her directives not to allow anybody to get Mr. Howell’s ashes. (See
Trial Tr., p.507, L.23 – p.508, L.20.)
The jury found Ms. Watring guilty on all three counts. (R., pp.352-53.) On each of the
felony counts, the district court imposed a unified sentence of one-and-one-half years fixed, to be
served concurrently. (R., pp.382-85.) On the misdemeanor count, the district court imposed a
concurrent sentence of 180 days jail time. (R., p.383.)
The district court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on restitution. (See 3/6/20 Tr., p.677,
L.22 – p.679, L.19.)

Before the restitution hearing, the presentence report had examined

Ms. Watring’s financial situation, which she described as very stressful due to her legal situation.
(See Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.17-20.)
At the restitution hearing, Ms. Watring testified about her inability to pay restitution.
(See 5/15/20 Tr., p.7, L.5 – p.15, L.18.) In particular, she did not own a home or have a bank
account or any other funds. (5/15/20 Tr., p.7, Ls.11-25.) Ms. Watring stated, “The last few
years, I’ve had to sell off everything I’ve owned just to be able to survive.” (5/15/20 Tr., p.7,
L.25 – p.8, L.1.) Additionally, she testified that she had medical debts and probably owed her
landlord back rent. (See 5/15/20 Tr., p.8, Ls.2-21.) Ms. Watring had an injury to her right ankle
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and scoliosis in her spine from her previous work in a lumber mill, and she was unable to get her
spine fused or her left knee replaced because she was allergic to metal. (See 5/15/20 Tr., p.9,
L.18 – p.10, L.6.) She testified that she had qualified for disability in 2007, but she preferred
working to sitting at home, and thought it was easier to deal with the pain than take drugs. (See
5/15/20 Tr., p.10, Ls.9-17.)
Further, Ms. Watring testified that she worked in home care and assisted living facilities
before her conviction for the instant offenses. (See 5/15/20 Tr., p.10, Ls.19-25.) She testified
that she was not trained for any other type of work, and she could no longer work in lumber
mills. (See 5/15/20 Tr., p.10, L.25 – p.11, L.2.) She did not know where she planned to stay
when she got out of prison. (5/15/20 Tr., p.11, Ls.3-6.) As for her plans for a job after she got
out, Ms. Watring testified, “That depends on if they clear me mentally because right now I’m in
the state—I’m depressed and I’m having panic attacks just being around more than four people
at a time.” (5/15/20 Tr., p.11, Ls.7-11.) She told the district court, “I haven’t been able to work
since the last day that I worked for the Howells . . . .” (5/15/20 Tr., p.11, Ls.12-16.)
On cross-examination, Ms. Watring testified that, although she remembered testifying at
trial that she was very industrious and have always had a job since she was a teenager, “I’m
years old now, and my body is not the same as it was when I was a teenager.” (5/15/20 Tr., p.13,
Ls.6-12.) She also testified that her family in the local community was not talking to her because
of this case. (See 5/15/20 Tr., p.13, L.25 – p.14, L.22.)
The State requested $103,491.44 in restitution.

(5/15/20 Tr., p.16, Ls.15-16; see

[Proposed] Order of Restitution and Judgment, submitted as of May 15, 2020.) That total
included $78,051.46 in checks and other amounts transferred through bank accounts, and
$25,439.38 in credit card debts accrued. (See 5/15/20 Tr., p.16, L.16 – p.17, L.11; R., p.397
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(State’s Ex. 13, p.2).)

The State argued that the $78,051.46 was above and beyond the

compensation Ms. Watring was paid for services rendered to the Howells.

(See 5/15/20

Tr., p.20, L.18 – p.21, L.2.)
Defense counsel first addressed “whether there’s a direct victim here.” (See 5/15/20
Tr., p.21, L.10 – p.22, L.1.) Ms. Watring’s counsel also made a public policy argument that
“there’s a lot less reason to order restitution when you don’t have a living victim,” and coupled
that argument with “Sherri’s lack of ability to pay at this point.” (See 5/15/20 Tr., p.22, Ls.5-11.)
Defense counsel concluded, “I think at this point, if you consider the fact that there’s no living
victim here, coupled with Sherri doesn’t have any foreseeable ability to pay, her sentence is
going to be done in just over a year, I don’t think that the Court should order restitution at this
point.” (5/15/20 Tr., p.23, Ls.14-19.) Ms. Watring’s counsel thought that “it should be sorted
out civilly.” (5/15/20 Tr., p.23, Ls.19-20.)
The district court took the matter under advisement. (5/15/20 Tr., p.25, Ls.3-4.) The
district court subsequently issued an Order Awarding Restitution. (R., pp.1133-61.) The district
court stated, “Seeking a restitution award in favor of the estate of William and Joella Howell, the
now-deceased couple Watring was found to have exploited while serving as their live-in
caretaker, the State presented no evidence beyond the trial transcript and in State’s Exhibit Nos.
13-16 from the trial.” (R., p.1133.) According to the district court, the State’s requested amount
was $103,491.44, drawn from “two figures from the second page of State’s Exhibit No. 13:
(1) $78,051.46, reflecting the total amount of checks to Watring drawn on the Howells’ accounts
and transfers from their accounts into her accounts; and (2) $25,439.98, reflecting credit-card
debts allegedly racked up by Watring in the Howells’ name.” (R., p.1133.)
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The district court determined, “The Howells are directly injured victims, eligible to
receive restitution under section 19-5304(1)(e)(i).”

(R., p.1134.)

The district court then

determined that Ms. Watring’s financial circumstances and earning ability did not justify
declining to enter any restitution at all, nor did they justify a restitution order in a lower amount
than the full economic loss proven by the State. (See R., pp.1135-36.) The district court opined
that the legislative policy favoring full compensation to crime victims who suffer economic loss
deserved heavier weight when the defendant committed a crime of theft. (See R., p.1135.)
The district court wrote, “According to the presentence report, Watring is now

years

old, was on food stamps, and had limited financial resources, significant health problems, and
not much in the way of an employment history or near-term employment prospects.”
(R., pp.1135-36 (citing PSI, pp.1, 17-19).) The district court also stated that Ms. Watring “was
last employed as the Howells’ in-home caretaker, and might be unemployable in that field
because of this case.” (R., p.1136 (internal citation omitted).) “Further, she’ll be in prison for
the next fourteen months or so, unable to earn any substantial amount of money.” (R., p.1136.)
The district court then stated, “Her testimony during the restitution hearing amplified these
themes. She may well lack the ‘foreseeable ability’ to fully repay a large restitution award.”
(R., p.1136.)
However, the district court then determined, “But she appears to have mostly supported
herself so far in her life, and it isn’t unlikely that she’ll find a way to support herself and be
capable of making modest restitution payments.” (R., p.1136.) The district court determined,
“The Court concludes, in its discretion, that Watring’s financial circumstances and earning
ability don’t justify declining to enter any restitution order at all, particularly not given that she
committed a theft-type crime.” (R., p.1136.) The district court also determined, “Nor do they
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justify a restitution order in a lower amount than the full economic loss the State has proved was
caused by her criminal conduct . . . .” (R., p.1136.)
The district court determined that the $78,051.46 figure requested by the State included
Ms. Watring’s paychecks totaling $34,274.00, as well as $4866.46 in unchallenged
reimbursements, dropping the $78,051.46 figure to $38,911.00.

(See R., pp.1136-37.)

Moreover, the district court determined that the State had not proven that the $25,439.98 in credit
card debts accumulated were for Ms. Watring’s benefit as opposed to the Howells’ benefit. (See
R., p.1137.)

Thus, the district court ordered no restitution for the accumulated debt.

(R., p.1137.)
As for the remaining $38,911.00 in alleged payments from the Howells’ accounts to
Ms. Watring, the district court determined, “The State proved by a preponderance of the
evidence not only that these transfers occurred but that Watring wasn’t entitled to them.” (See
R., pp.1137-38.) Thus, the district court ordered Ms. Watring “to pay restitution of $38,911.00.”
(R., p.1138.) Specifically, the district court ordered that Ms. Watring was “to pay William and
Joella Howell $38,911.00 in restitution, without accruing interest.” (R., p.1139.)
Meanwhile, Ms. Watring had filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the Judgment of
Conviction and Commitment. (R., pp.389-91.)

8

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by entering an order of restitution without properly
considering Ms. Watring’s ability to repay the amount in the future?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Entering An Order Of Restitution Without Properly
Considering Ms. Watring’s Ability To Repay The Amount In The Future

A.

Introduction
Ms. Watring asserts the district court abused its discretion by entering an order of

restitution without properly considering her ability to repay the amount in the future. The district
court determined that Ms. Watring’s “financial circumstances and earning ability don’t justify
declining to enter any restitution order at all, particularly not given that she committed a thefttype crime,” and they did not “justify a restitution order in a lower amount than the full economic
loss the State has proved was caused by her criminal conduct . . . .” (R., p.1136.) The district
court ultimately ordered Ms. Watring to pay $38,911.00 in restitution. (R., p.1139.) However,
the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards, because there is no
substantial evidence that Ms. Watring has any foreseeable ability to repay the amount of
restitution awarded.

B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court reviews a district court’s order of restitution for abuse of discretion,

“examining whether the trial court ‘(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the
exercise of reason.’” State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, ___, 462 P.3d 1125, 1145 (2020) (quoting
State v. Bodenbach, 165 Idaho 577, 591 (2019)).
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C.

The District Court Did Not Act Consistently With The Applicable Legal Standards,
Because There Is No Substantial Evidence That Ms. Watring Has Any Foreseeable
Ability To Repay The Amount Of Restitution Awarded
“[W]hether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within the district court’s

discretion and is guided by consideration of the factors set forth in Idaho Code section 195304(7).” Garcia, 166 Idaho at ___, 462 P.3d at 1145 (quoting State v. Wisdom, 161 Idaho 916,
919 (2017)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). “These factors include
‘the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense, the financial
resources, needs and earning ability of the defendant, and such other factors as the court deems
appropriate.’” Id. (quoting I.C. § 19-5304(7)).
“The immediate inability to pay restitution by a defendant shall not be, in and of itself, a
reason to not order restitution.”

Id. (quoting I.C. § 19-5304(7)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “[A] court may order restitution based on a foreseeable ability to repay the award.” Id.
(quoting Wisdom, 161 Idaho at 924) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
“A district court’s determination that a defendant has a foreseeable ability to repay the award is a
factual finding that will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence.” Id. at
___, 462 P.3d at 1145-46. “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept to support a conclusion.” State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885 (2013).
In Garcia, the Idaho Supreme Court held the district court abused its discretion by
entering an order of restitution in the amount of $162,285.27 without properly considering the
defendant’s ability to repay the amount in the future. See Garcia, 166 Idaho at ___, 462 P.3d at
1145-46. The Garcia Court held that the district court “abused its discretion by failing to
recognize the outer boundaries of its discretion in failing to identify the proper standard.” Id. at
___, 462 P.3d at 1146. The district court correctly acknowledged the proper factors to consider
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in crafting an order of restitution, and correctly identified that the immediate inability to pay
restitution is not alone a reason to not order restitution. See id., 462 P.3d at 1146. However, the
district court in Garcia “did not recognize that the ‘immediate inability’ of a defendant to pay is
a separate concept from the ‘foreseeable ability’ of the defendant to repay the award.” See id.,
462 P.3d at 1146 (quoting Wisdom, 161 Idaho at 924).
The Garcia Court also held that “the district court abused its discretion by not showing
an exercise of reason.” Id., 462 P.3d at 1146. The district court’s analysis of the defendant’s
ability to pay consisted “of one sentence: ‘Having considered [Garcia’s] economic
circumstances, the Court concludes that an order of restitution is appropriate in this case.’” Id.,
462 P.3d at 1146 (alteration in original). However, “nothing in the presentence materials serves
as ‘substantial evidence’ that Garcia has any foreseeable ability to repay the amount of restitution
awarded.” Id. at ___, 462 P.3d at 1146-47.
The Garcia Court explained that “nothing in our decision today should suggest that a
district court is required to divine a defendant’s future financial capabilities, or that a district
court should limit a victim’s right to restitution to what is presently known about the defendant.”
Id. at ___, 462 P.3d at 1147. “A defendant facing a lengthy prison sentence may be dramatically
different and markedly more employable after his release than he was at the time of his crime.”
Id., 462 P.3d at 1147. But the district court “did not address Garcia’s future ability to repay at
all. This is a failure to show an exercise of reason, and therefore constitutes an abuse of
discretion.” Id., 462 P.3d at 1147.
As part of its analysis, the Garcia Court discussed two prior cases where Idaho appellate
courts held that a district court had properly considered a defendant’s ability to repay restitution
in the future. See id. at ___, 462 P.3d at 1146. In Wisdom, one of those cases, the defendant

12

asserted that the district court’s restitution order awarding $11,069.82 constituted an abuse of
discretion because she was unable to repay it. See Wisdom, 161 Idaho at 924-25. The district
court had found that the defendant had a foreseeable ability to repay the award. Id. at 924.
The Idaho Supreme Court in Wisdom held, “The presentence materials serve as
substantial evidence supporting that conclusion.” Id. at 924. Specifically, the presentence
materials stated that the defendant had no physical or mental impairments hindering her
employability, and she was therefore capable of working to repay the restitution award. See id.
Moreover, while the defendant was unemployed at the time of the offense and had no viable
source of income at the time of the presentence report, she had found a job paying an amount
close to minimum wage by the time of the restitution hearing. See id. Thus, the Wisdom Court
held that the restitution award did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Id. at 925.
Both the Garcia and Wisdom Courts examined State v. Bybee, 115 Idaho 541 (Ct. App.
1989) (per curiam). See Garcia, 166 Idaho at ___, 462 P.3d at 1145-46; Wisdom, 161 Idaho at
924-25. In Bybee, the defendant asserted that the district court abused its discretion by ordering
a total of $1,628,738 in restitution for grand theft of precious metals. See Bybee, 115 Idaho at
542. The defendant had stolen the precious metals, or the monetary value they represented, from
his former clients in his investment service to engage in speculative trading. See id. On appeal,
the defendant asserted that the district court improperly applied the factors of his financial needs
and earning ability, and his immediate inability to pay restitution. See id.
The Court of Appeals in Bybee wrote that the defendant was

years old, had no

present asserts, and would be unable to earn any significant amounts of money during his prison
sentence. See id. But while the district court recognized that the defendant had no present
earning capacity or ability to pay, the district court also “noted that Bybee has the business
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acumen to earn money for restitution upon his eventual release from prison.” Id. Further, “the
immediate inability to pay restitution would not, in and of itself, bar the court from ordering
restitution.” Id. (citing I.C. § 19-5304(7)). The Bybee Court stated, “Given the magnitude of the
amounts involved here, we believe it unlikely that Bybee will ever meet the full amount of
restitution ordered.” Id. However, “in the event Bybee is able to obtain some assets, the victims
should have ready access to the assets for satisfaction of their losses. The order of restitution
will provide the essential avenue of relief to the victims.” Id. Thus, the Bybee Court held, “the
order of restitution will not be disturbed on this appeal.”
Here, there is no substantial evidence that Ms. Watring has any foreseeable ability to
repay the amount of restitution ordered by the district court. The presentence report stated that
Ms. Watring said she was currently unemployed and had not worked after providing home health
care for Ms. Howell. (PSI, p.17.) She “listed her job skills/experience as ‘caregiver, landscaper,
mill-worker.’” (PSI, p.18.) Ms. Watring also “stated she currently receives public assistance in
the form of food stamps in addition to being financially supported by her son, Lucas.” (PSI,
pp.19-20.) “She described her financial situation as being ‘very stressful’ due to her legal
situation and said she pays her bills when she can.”

(PSI, p.20.) Further, she had atrial

fibrillation, coronary artery disease, and chronic bronchitis, and she was taking gabapentin for
nerve damage in her leg, ankle, and spine. (PSI, p.18.) Ms. Watring also commented that her
mental health was very poor. (PSI, p.18.) She stated, “I have had to sell everything [I] own of
value because [I can’t] work, my whole life has been [destroyed] because [of] these allegations
against me.” (PSI, p.19.)
At the restitution hearing, Ms. Watring’s counsel asserted that Ms. Watring has “done a
lot of work with elderly people, and that’s what she was trained to do. That’s what she has
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always done. She’s not trained for any other type of work.” (5/15/20 Tr., p.22, Ls.13-16.)
Defense counsel also told the district court that Ms. Watring had debts, and she did not own a
home or have a bank account. (See 5/15/20 Tr., p.22, Ls.16-19.) Ms. Watring’s counsel further
asserted that there was no indication that Ms. Watring could get funds from her family and
friends in town. (See 5/15/20 Tr., p.22, Ls.20-24.) Moreover, Ms. Watring’s health problems
“may preclude her from doing any other type of work that she did in the past.” (See 5/15/20
Tr., p.22, L.24 – p.23, L.1.) Defense counsel asserted that it was unclear whether Ms. Watring
would qualify for disability in the future. (See 5/15/20 Tr., p.23, Ls.2-5.) According to her
counsel, Ms. Watring did not “really have any plans for a job when she gets out,” nor did she
“know where’s she’s going to stay.” (5/15/20 Tr., p.23, Ls.5-7.)
The district court was well aware of all of the above, recognizing that Ms. Watring “is
now

years old, was on food stamps, had limited financial resources, significant health

problems, and not much in the way of an employment history or near-term employment
prospects.” (See R., pp.1135-36.) The district court also wrote that Ms. Watring “might be
unemployable” in the field of in-home caretaking because of this case, and she would be “unable
to earn any substantial amount of money” while serving her prison sentence. (See R., p.1136.)
Indeed, the district court observed that Ms. Watring “may well lack the ‘foreseeable ability’ to
fully repay a large restitution award.” (R., p.1136.)
Nonetheless, the district court determined that Ms. Watring “appears to have mostly
supported herself so far in her life, and it isn’t unlikely that she’ll find a way to support herself
and be capable of making modest restitution payments.” (R., p.1136.) There is no substantial
evidence to support this determination. Unlike in Wisdom, there is no evidence that Ms. Watring
had been able to gain employment after the instant offense. See Wisdom, 161 Idaho at 924-25.
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Moreover, in contrast to the defendant in Bybee, there is no evidence that Ms. Watring has the
“business acumen” required to repay even the more modest restitution award in this case. See
Bybee, 115 Idaho at 542. The district court’s analysis glossed over the fact that Ms. Watring had
“mostly supported herself” with in-home caretaking, through working for the Howells for almost
a decade. Indeed, the district court acknowledged that Ms. Watring would have trouble working
in that field because of this case, and Ms. Watring wrote during the presentence investigation
that she had been unable to work. (See R., pp.1136; PSI, p.19.) Further, there is no evidence on
this record that Ms. Watring’s health problems would improve in the future.
Thus, contrary to the district court’s determination, there is no substantial evidence that
Ms. Watring has any foreseeable ability to repay the amount of restitution ordered by the district
court. See Garcia, 166 Idaho at ___, 462 P.3d at 1145-46. Accordingly, the district court abused
its discretion by entering an order of restitution without properly considering Ms. Watring’s
ability to repay the amount in the future, because the district court did not act consistently with
the applicable legal standards. The order of restitution should be vacated.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Ms. Watring respectfully requests that this Court vacate the
district court’s order of restitution.
DATED this 3rd day of February, 2021.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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